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ALIENS-REFUGEES-RESETTLEMENT IN TamD COUNTRY NOT RELE-
VANT TO DETERMINATION OF ELIGIBILITY FOR REFUGEE STATUS.
Chien Woo v. Rosenberg (9th Cir. 1969).
In 1953 Yee Chien Woo fled to Hong Kong from Communist
China. He established himself in business there, married and had
one son. In 1960 he entered the United States as a temporary
business visitor, and he has never departed. His family joined him
in 1965 after being admitted to the United States as temporary
visitors. In 1966, after expiration of his permitted stay, Woo failed
to depart, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service com-
menced deportation proceedings. On March 8, 1966 Woo applied
for classification as a refugee under the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act.1 The application was denied by the District Director,
1. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (Supp. V, 1970). 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (a) (7) (Supp.
V, 1970) provides as follows:
Conditional entries shall next be made available by the Attorney
General, pursuant to such regulations as he may prescribe and
in a number not to exceed 6 per centum of the number specified
in section 1151 (a) (ii) of this title, to aliens who satisfy an Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service officer at an examination in any
non-Communist or non-Communist dominated country, (A) that
(i) because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, or political opinion they have fled (I) from any
Communist or Communist-dominated country or area, or (II)
from any country within the general area of the Middle East, and
(ii) are unable or unwilling to return to such country or area on
account of race, religion, or political opinion, and (iii) are not na-
tionals of the countries or areas in which their application for
conditional entry is made; or (B) that they are persons uprooted
by catastrophic natural calamity as defined by the President who
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and the Regional Commissioner affirmed on the ground that
Woo's resettlement in Hong Kong made him ineligible for refugee
status. The federal district court reversed that decision holding,
on the facts, that Woo had not become firmly resettled.2 The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the result but held
that the matter of resettlement was irrelevant to the determination
of eligibility for refugee status. Chien Woo v. Rosenberg, 419 F.2d
252 (9th Cir. 1969).
3
The Woo decision was the first pronouncement on the matter of
resettlement by a federal court of appeals. The court disregarded
all precedent in administrative and district court proceedings and,
in effect, made new law. Such a step was probably not necessary
in the situation which confronted the court in Woo.
4
Prior to Woo, the Immigration and Naturalization Service had
long considered the resettlement factor to be a key item in the
determination of refugee status. 5 A district court agreed in the
case of Min Chin Wu v. Fullilove.6 The court said that a refugee
must not have been resettled, must not be a national of the country
in which he applies for conditional entry and must be a refugee
from a Communist or Communist-dominated country at the time
are unable to return to their usual place of abode. For the
purpose of the foregoing the term "general area of the Middle
East" means the area between and including (1) Libya on the
west, (2) Turkey on the north, (3) Pakistan on the east, and (4)
Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia on the south: Provided, That immi-
grant visas in a number not exceeding one-half the number
specified in this paragraph may be made available, in lieu of condi-
tional entries of a like number, to such aliens who have been
continuously physically present in the United States for a period of
at least two years prior to application for adjustment of status.
2. Chien Woo v. Rosenberg, 295 F. Supp. 1370 at 1372 (S.D. Cal. 1968).
3. Cert. granted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3167 (U.S. Oct. 20, 1970) (No. 156).
4. Apparently, the court could have simply affirmed the district court's
findings without reaching the resettlement issue as such. However, the
lower court's seeming rejection of the facts found at the administrative
hearing may have posed some difficulties in this regard. Judicial review is
normally confined to the administrative record, and the facts established at
the administrative level are usually conclusive. 2 C. GoanoN & H.
ROSENFIMLD, ImMIGRATiON LAW AND PROCEDURE, §§ 8.9Ah, 8.11b, 8.12c (1969).
5. Matter of Sun, 12 I. & N. Dec. 36 (1966); Matter of Rodriguez, 11 I. &
N. Dec. 901 (1966); Matter of Moy, 12 I. & N. Dec. 117 (1967); Matter of
Moy, 12 I. & N. Dec. 121 (1967); Matter of Ng, 12 I. & N. Dec. 411 (1967);
Matter of Chai, 12 I. & N. Dec. 81 (1967); Matter of Hung, 12 I. & N. Dec.
178 (1967).
6. 282 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
of application for entry.7 This reasoning was approved by another
district court in Alidede v. Hurney.8 The district court in Woo's
case discussed resettlement but found on the facts that Woo had
not been firmly resettledY
In reaching its conclusion on resettlement, the Ninth Circuit ex-
amined the intent of Congress. The court noted that refugee acts
passed in 1948 and 1953 expressly excluded persons who had been
resettled from the benefits of refugee status.10 However, the
court found that such a provision was omitted from four similar
statutes passed in later years" and the phrase "not nationals" (of
the intermediate country in which the applications are made) put in
its place. 12 Thus, the matter of Woo's resettlement in Hong Kong
was not relevant. What was relevant, said the court, was that he
was not a national of Hong Kong or the United Kingdom but, in
fact, was a national of Communist China and as a refugee from
that country remained stateless.
13
The government argued that Congress did not intend that a per-
son could remain a refugee in spite of resettlement in a third coun-
try and that to so hold would make thousands of former refugees,
who are now firmly resettled, eligible to apply for conditional en-
try under the present statute. The court concluded:
But Congress appears to have met this possibility by specifically
limiting the number of those who can claim conditional entry un-
der the "Seventh Preference." In any event we cannot disregard
the clear manifestation of congressional intent shown by the sub-
stitution, in 1957, of the status "not a national" for that of "not
firmly resettled" as formerly specified in the 1953 Act. Nothing in
the legislative history advanced by appellant persuades us that
7. Id. at 65. The court said:
Once an individual has stopped fleeing and is safely resettled, re-
gardiess of the country which he may choose he is outside of
the scope of Congressional concern as evidenced by [the present]
statute.
8. 301 F. Supp. 1031, 1032 (N.D. Ill. 1969). Here a Yugoslav refugee
became naturalized in Turkey and later came to the United States as a
visitor. The court denied his application for refugee status because of his
resettlement, his Turkish nationality and because he left Turkey to visit
relatives and did not flee because of persecution or fear of persecution on
account of race, religion or political opinion.
9. 295 F. Supp. at 1372.
10. 419 F.2d at 254. The statutes referred to are the Displaced Persons
Act of 1948, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009 and the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, ch. 336,
67 Stat. 400.
11. Refugee Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639; Fair Share
Refugee Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat. 504; Migration and Refugee
Assistance Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-510, 76 Stat. 121; 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (a) (7)
(Supp. V, 1970).
12. 419 F.2d at 254. The phrase "not nationals" appears only in the Fair
Share Refugee Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-648, § 1, 74 Stat. 504 and in the
present statute at 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (a) (7) (A) (iii) (Supp. V, 1970).
13. 419 F.2d at 254.
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Congress intended this substituted language to mean anything but
what it clearly says.14
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently handed
down a decision which rejected the Ninth Circuit's holding as to
the resettlement factor.15 The court considered that the Ninth Cir-
cuit broadened the statute to mean "not a national of the interme-
diate host country. ... "I The Second Circuit, however, felt that
the statutory language meant only that a person may not be a
national of one of the seven countries in which applications for
conditional entry may be made as specified by the Attorney Gen-
eral.17 The court found that this more limited interpretation was
supported by a reading of the 1960 act' s under which applications
for parole into the United States-the procedure used to admit
refugees until the present statute became effective-could only be
made before immigration officers in those same countries which
the Attorney General has designated under the present law.' 9
Thus, the Second Circuit was not persuaded that the substitution
of the present language for the "resettled" language of earlier
acts represented any congressional intent to alter the previous law.
The court also noted that the Immigration and Naturalization
Service had used the "firmly resettled" factor for several years as
grounds for denying conditional entry applications and that this fact
had been reported to Congress with no indication of disapproval
from that body.
20
It is not at all clear that congressional intent changed with
respect to resettlement after 1957. While the statutory language
did omit any reference to resettlement, this fact by itself is not
persuasive when compared with the tremendous effect of such a
change on the refugee immigrant category. By extending the
benefits of refugee status to those with established permanent
14. Id. (citations omitted). The limitation on the number of those who
can claim conditional entry or adjustment of status as refugees is 10,200
per year.
15. Shen v. Esperdy, 428 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1970).
16. 428 F.2d at 298 n.9, citing 419 F.2d at 254.
17. 428 F.2d at 298. Present regulations require applicants for condi-
tional entry as refugees to be physically present and make their appli-
cations in one of seven countries in Europe and the liddle East. 8 C.F.R.
§ 235.9a (1970). Aliens with two years presence in the United States may
apply for adjustment of status under 8 C.F.R. § 245.4 (1970).
18. 74 Stat. 504.
19. 428 F.2d at 299.
20. Id. at 301, 302.
homes in third countries, the law would put homeless refugees at
such a serious disadvantage that it is inconceivable the Congress
could have intended this result without clear language to that
effect. For example, a person who fled one of the Baltic states in
1940 and settled in a third country without ever becoming natural-
ized there would, 30 years later, be as eligible as recent refugees
for one of the 10,200 quota numbers available each year. The
addition of resettled persons to the refugee category could easily
cause the quota to be oversubscribed. 21 It would then be necessary
to maintain quota waiting lists with the result that refugees
might encounter delays of several years before they could be proc-
essed for entry into the United States. The government would not
be able to respond quickly to natural or political upheavals, and,
of course, the refugees produced by these events would be forced to
settle elsewhere until their turn had been reached on the waiting
list. This result is incredible in view of the fact that one of the pur-
poses of the present law is to permit the government to act
quickly in the face of such upheavals.22 Nothing in the legislative
history of the present or previous laws suggests that the Congress
intended such a development.
2
3
Other disadvantages of the Woo holding for homeless refugees
are highlighted by a look at the nonimmigrant aspect of the immi-
grant law. In order for Woo to enter the United States as a tem-
porary business visitor in 1960, he had to convince an American
consular officer in his visa application and an immigration officer
at the time of entry that he had a permanent residence outside of
the United States which he had no intention of abandoning and to
which he intended to return at the end of his temporary stay.24
When his wife applied for the temporary visitor's visa and entry
into the United States-after apparently being separated from her
husband for five years-she also had to establish the same facts. 25
The Woos could establish their visitor status in large part because
of their permanent residence in Hong Kong. Non-settled refugees
cannot normally establish eligibility for visitor status due to their
lack of such a residence. Under Woo, they would have to compete
21. The State Department Visa Office reports that refugees used the
full quota allotment in fiscal year 1969. U.S. Dep't of State, 1969 Report
of the Visa Office at 6 (1970).
22. 2 U.S. CODE CO . & AD. NEws (1965) at 3334.
23. A good summary of the legislative history of the refugee question
is found in Shen, supra, and cases cited therein.
24. A temporary visitor is an alien ". . . having a residence in a for-
eign country which he has no intention of abandoning and who is
visiting the United States temporarily for business or temporarily for
pleasure." 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (15) (B) (1964).
25. Certain facts established in the district court raise some provoca-
tive, if unanswered, questions along this line. Admittedly, the facts in the
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for quota numbers with settled refugees, many of whom would be
able to enjoy the benefits of a stay in the United States while
applying for adjustment of status.
The reasons why Congress has not included the resettlement
factor in the present law are not apparent. It is possible, of course,
that a change in procedures was intended. However, it does not
seem logical that the Congress would profess to give the govern-
ment more flexibility in dealing with refugees while establishing a
opinion do not constitute the complete record upon which the opinion was
based, and the questions are discussed here for their general applicability
to similar cases.
The district court found that Woo never intended to reside perma-
nently in Hong Kong. It distinguished three cases cited by the govern-
ment because "... here plaintiff never intended to remain in Hong Kong
permanently." 295 F. Supp. at 1372. It said that the record revealed that
Woo considered Hong Kong a temporary refuge and that he remained
there only because he was forced to by economic and other circumstances.
Id. A person is ineligible for a visa and is excludable from the United
States if he ". . . has procured a visa or other documentation, or seeks to
enter the United States, by fraud, or by wilfully misrepresenting a ma-
terial fact." 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (19) (1964). An alien in the United States is
deportable if he fell within an excludable class at the time of entry. 8
U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1) (1964). An alien who is inadmissible to the United
States will not be granted adjustment of status to that of an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence. 2 C. GoRuoD & H. RosENmrsu, IMMI-
GRATION LAW AND PROcEDURE, 7.7b at 7-61 (1969).
If an alien's intent not to reside permanently in his foreign domicile is
the basis for finding that he was never "firmly resettled" in an intermediate
country, would not that same intent, if undisclosed to the consular and
immigration officers in temporary visitor applications, render him ex-
cludable from the United States and ineligible for adjustment of status
regardless of his classification as a refugee? It would seem that the
finding of refugee status on the basis of intent not to take up permanent
residence in the intermediate country immediately raises a presumption
of ineligibility where the alien is in the United States in a temporary
status.
A temporary visitor for business may not engage in purely local em-
ployment or labor for hire; the term "business" indicates only legitimate
activities of a commercial or professional character. 22 C.F.R. § 41.25(b)
(1970). The business visitor must still exhibit a clear intent to retain his
foreign residence and domicile; the principal place of business and the place
where the profit accrues must remain in the foreign country, and while the
business activity need not be temporary, the various entries into the
United States must individually and separately be of a plainly temporary
character. 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMnMGRATION LAW AND PROcEDURE,
§ 2.8b at 2-45, 2-46.
The district court found that Woo's business and financial holdings
were confiscated by the Chinese Communist government in 1952 but that
he was unable to earn and save enough money in Hong Kong for several
trips to the United States. In fact, said the court in 1968, "He is now in a
system which in practice makes that flexibility a sham. It is
also difficult to understand how the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service could be permitted to apply the resettlement factor
without any sign of legislative disapproval if Congress had intended
the contrary. Finally, it is reasonable to assume that a system
which contains serious disadvantages for the homeless refugee
would only be adopted with a clear expression of congressional in-
tent as to the desired result. Otherwise, the result is absurd.
The statute, as written, may permit settled persons to qualify
for refugee status. On balance, however, it is highly questionable
whether Congress contemplated such a result.
ROBERT A. MAUTiNo
CIVIL RIGHTS-STATE AcTION-CUSTOMs HAVING THE FORCE OF
LAW BY VIRTUE OF PERSISTENT PRACTICES OF STATE OFFICIALS
CONSTrrUTE STATE ACTION. Adickes v. S.H. Kress and Com-
pany (U.S. 1970).
Plaintiff-petitioner, Sandra Adickes, a white volunteer summer
Freedom School teacher and full time teacher in the New York City
School System, brought an action against S.H. Kress and Com-
pany in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York" to recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 19832 for an
alleged violation of her civil rights. Miss Adickes and six Negro
students attempted to use the Hattiesburg, Mississippi library fa-
cilities3 and then, while under police surveillance, proceeded to
the local Kress store to eat lunch. The Kress waitress, under or-
ders from the store manager, took the orders of the Negro students,
but refused to serve petitioner. The waitress stated: "We have to
position to provide for himself and his family in this country. Indeed, he
has been doing so for the past eight years." 295 F. Supp. at 1372 (emphasis
added). The implication is that he had been gainfully employed since his
entry into the United States. A temporary visitor who fails to maintain
his status is deportable. 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (9) (1964).
1. Adickes v. S.11. Kress & Co., 252 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
3. 252 F. Supp. at 142. Petitioner and her Negro students were denied
use of the public library, at which time it was closed by the police.
